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Abstract 
 
The obligation of ‘progressive realization’ under the International Covenant on Economic and 
Social Rights is often interpreted in light of available resources - this chapter examines, instead, 
the variable of time. Noting that delay of rights is akin to denial of rights, Young explores the 
various ways in which accountability models, at the international level, have elaborated on 
concrete, and temporal, benchmarks. These include the minimum core, and non-retrogression 
doctrines, and the exercises in comparative rankings. These are important sources of 
accountability, especially for positive obligations. And yet with the promise of rights, law 
nevertheless structures the expectations of rights-holders. This chapter examples how 'waiting' 
for rights may be an especially passive, disempowering, and anti-solidaristic experience and in 
so doing reveals greater insight on a tension with underlies the recognition of fundamental 
material interests as rights. 
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I. Introduction1 
In international human rights law, waiting is an accepted part of rights realization. To realize a 
right, a state must often act positively, and often over time. Duties towards rights-holders include 
duties on the part of the state to both restrain itself and to act. Each take time, and positive duties 
to fulfil rights, in particular, may take a considerable time, especially for states with limited 
resources, or uncoordinated or immature institutions. The lapse between rights recognition and 
rights fulfilment is often given the shorthand of ‘progressive realization’, which is the obligation 
by which state parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                 
1 With thanks to participants of the Future of Economic and Social Rights Conference, Boston College, April 2016, 
and the Women in International Law Workshop, Chicago, April 2018, as well as to Kris Collins, Vlad Perju and 
Paulo Barrozo. 
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agree to be bound.2 Of course, waiting can apply to civil and political rights as well, and 
prominent metrics have been developed to account for when such delay becomes unacceptable, 
such as for the right to a fair trial. In this chapter, I claim that not only new metrics, but indeed a 
new framework of understanding, are required, in order to address the ubiquity of waiting in 
relation to economic and social rights. 
By seeking to emphasise the ubiquity of waiting, I mean to underline the broad legal character of 
economic and social rights under international human rights law, as well as under the 
constitutional or statutory laws in many domestic settings.3 Thus, I am not (merely) referring 
here to the well-understood waiting associated with justiciable rights and the remedies that flow 
from them. For the recognition of such delay, one need only reference the U.S. school 
desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education, which has had so much influence on the 
development of constitutional law in that setting, as well as the developing jurisprudence of 
constitutional rights in many other countries.4 In Brown v. Board of Education II, the U.S. 
Supreme Court famously required, in the follow-up orders seeking to enforce school 
desegregation on the part of recalcitrant Southern States, that the intentional separation of 
schoolchildren on the basis of race be halted ‘with all deliberate speed’.5 An extended period of 
waiting resulted for many in the position of the claimants, not only due to the vagueness of the 
‘all deliberate speed’ standard, but because the powers of the courts to enforce this injunction, 
simultaneously across so many sites, was limited. More contemporary cases which involve a 
direct assessment of the positive obligations that arise from constitutionally guaranteed economic 
and social rights follow a similar pattern of enforcement-with-waiting. In the prominent South 
African case of Grootboom,6 for instance, the Constitutional Court held that the right to housing 
was infringed by the state’s inability to provide Irene Grootboom and her community with crisis 
                                                 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’), art. 2(1), New York, 16 December 
1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
3 Of course, the ‘legal’ character of international law, on the one hand, and constitutional law, on the other, is 
distinct, despite parallels. These are addressed below, but the chapter is concerned to draw attention to similar 
concepts and standards that guide interpreters in each. 
4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (U.S.) For an attempt to track both local and global 
influence, see, e.g., Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s Educational Landmark (Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
5 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (‘Brown II’) 301. For analysis, see Michael Klarman, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
6 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
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housing: yet the Constitutional Court was reluctant to do more with its declaratory order than 
signal the infringement. Years passed before the community itself was permanently housed 
(Irene Grootboom herself passed away, 8 years later, waiting for relocation), and before similarly 
situated rights-holders could access crisis shelter.7 
Yet the concerns about courts entering the fray of government action – of ordering positive 
remedial action for economic and social rights enforcement – is only one aspect of the problem 
of waiting, to which this chapter responds. Indeed, the issue of waiting points to broader debates 
about economic and social rights in general. For some, the delay of legal rights calls for direct 
condemnation of the pretensions of ‘rights’ language: it is the availability of remedy – and its 
immediate delivery – that reveals how far a society goes in assigning heightened protection to 
certain interests.8 This realist position applies to downgrade the importance of unenforceable 
constitutional protections in domestic settings, just as it applies to demote unenforceable human 
rights protections within the international framework.9 Others, on the other hand, regard the 
ubiquity of waiting as not significant per se, whether because the law cannot always be expected 
to replicate the moral duties that are appropriately attached to rights, or because positive 
obligations are just as critical in satisfying the values of human dignity or freedom as negative 
ones, however more difficult to hold to account.10 
My own view does not fall neatly under either position, which I see as replicating now-surpassed 
debates – as to whether economic, social and cultural rights are ‘really’ human rights;11 or as to 
                                                 
7 A nuanced assessment of the delays experienced, for the implementation of a national emergency housing policy, 
on the one hand, and the settlement order, on the other, see Malcolm Langford and Steve Kahanovitz, ‘South Africa: 
Rethinking Enforcement Narratives’ in Malcolm Langford, César A. Rodríguez Garavito, and Julieta Rossi (eds), 
Social rights judgments and the politics of compliance: making it stick (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 315, 
322-333. 
8 E.g., Daryl Levinson, ‘Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibrium’, (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 857, 
924-26. 
9 For drawing parallels in the enforcement problems of both international law and constitutional law, see Jack 
Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law’ (2009) 122 
Harvard Law Review 1791. 
10 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) (presenting a three-part typology to cut across negative and positive duties).  
11 For a convincing response, see Amartya Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 315 (responding to interlocuters, including Onora O’Neill and Maurice Cranston). 
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whether they ‘really’ are justiciable.12 Even if one does not regard those debates as answered by 
prominent philosophical justifications,13 they have at the very least been overtaken by the 
widespread constitutional uptake of economic and social rights, their growing justiciability, and 
the growing recognition that rights protection can be advanced outside of court settings.14 Yet 
the issue of waiting remains a significant one, and attention to it, I argue, helps to reframe and 
update the contemporary debates around legal economic and social rights. It becomes necessary 
to make new inquiries, not only as to the metrics of economic and social rights delay – of how 
long is too long – but as to whether there are different features of waiting that have been 
neglected by the conventional acceptance of some postponement or delay. 
This chapter approaches this topic by exploring the standard by which international human rights 
law – and in particular, international economic and social rights law – addresses the ubiquity of 
waiting. It thus starts from a context in which justiciability and courts are secondary 
considerations. Instead, it takes a legal standard that is understood to hold governments and 
officials to account, without assuming a judicial remedy. Although I note the special implications 
of remedial options devised by a court, for the most part my suggestions are relevant to 
economic and social rights that are operate as directive, regulatory principles by which states are 
held to account, although they are also relevant to the question of justiciable complaints. This is 
the teleological standard of ‘progressive realization’.  
This analysis proceeds in three parts. Part II of this chapter expands upon the duty to realize 
rights progressively. The language of progressive realization is supposed to trigger (and/or 
condition) duties of accountability according to the apparatus of international human rights law. 
Oftentimes, discussions of this standard focus on how the language of ‘maximum available 
                                                 
12 Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:  Should There Be 
an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 
American Journal of International Law 462. 
13 E.g., Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’. 
14 E.g., Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights:  Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (2008); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism:  Theory and 
Practice (2013). 
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resources’ releases certain states from the stringency of immediate duties to realize rights. 15 In 
this chapter, however, I focus on the standards that apply to the passing of time in general. By 
examining this development, the aim of this chapter is to explore how the experience of waiting 
has been identified by those interpreting economic and social rights – to food, health care, 
housing, education and social security – under the ICESCR. This discussion therefore engages a 
body of analysis – contained in general comments and concluding observations – that are often 
dismissed as concealing the ‘actual’ controls on authoritative bodies, and on the states whose 
behaviour they themselves seek to control. Although this criticism is especially reserved for 
international bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
interprets the ICESCR, it is also levied at domestic courts engaged with the rights guarantees of 
public law. Yet to dismiss such analysis is to ignore the institutionalized forms of reason-giving 
pursued in legal pronouncements – such that we cease talking about reasons altogether. This 
chapter therefore elects to approach the problem of waiting through this lens. Readers sceptical 
of doctrinal exegesis are invited to take its contribution as conceptual only, in reconciling the 
import of postponable, if optimizable, rights. 
Part III turns briefly to history, to examine the alternative concepts that had been discussed at the 
time of drafting the ICESCR, such as the express inclusion of time frames and time limits in the 
duty of progressive realization. Furthermore, I address the question as to whether the acceptance 
of waiting has been based on a binary understanding of temporality – as either absolute 
(immediate obligations) or flexibility (unaccountable and perhaps indefinite delay). Part IV of 
this chapter calls for a more variegated understanding of the stakes of waiting. Initiating an 
inquiry into these effects provides a more focused argument as to how an ‘optimizing’ view of 
rights may be defeated, due to the docility, passivity, and anti-solidarity that can be created for 
rights-holders themselves. The chapter closes with preliminary thoughts about how economic 
and social rights law could develop with a more nuanced understanding of the problem of 
waiting and its complexity.  
                                                 
15 E.g., Olivier De Schutter, ‘Public Budget Analysis’, and Rodrigo Uprimny et. al., ‘Bridging the Gap’, in this 
volume. 
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II. The curious case of progressive realization  
In concluding a common standard of achievement for human rights, the United Nations General 
Assembly pioneered, with its Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, a new legal form 
especially adapted to the diversity of nation-states. Openly aspirational, and unreservedly 
teleological, the UDHR had, in the minds of its drafters, straddled at least two mindsets: that 
human rights were best protected by the rule of law, and that the declaration itself should remain 
unenforceable. In it, member states pledged to promote the respect for human rights, by 
‘progressive measures, both national and international’,16 so that the enumerated human rights 
could be ‘fully realized’.17 A follow-up treaty, that would provide detail to the obligations, in a 
binding form, was slated for the near future. 
Later, of course, that treaty was split and an obligation of ‘progressive realization’ was 
formulated: a standard reserved for the category of economic, social and cultural rights. In 1966, 
a larger, more plural, and more polarized United Nations settled on the enumerated rights of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, encompassing rights to food, 
health, housing, education, social security, and work, which were to be ‘fully realized 
progressively’.18 This caveat, relaxing the manner and time in which obligations were to be 
fulfilled, was accompanied by others: that state parties ‘undertake to take steps,’ ‘individually 
and through international cooperation,’ ‘economic[ally] and technical[ly]’ and through 
‘legislative measures,’ to the ‘maximum of its available resources.’19 No similar flexibility was 
outlined for the obligations associated with the contemporaneous International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, whose enumerated rights were understood to be immediately 
realizable; a distinction subject to lengthy commentary.20  
                                                 
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’), Paris, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217 A, 
Preamble.   
17 UDHR, Preamble; art. 28. 
18 ICESCR, art. 2(1). 
19 ICESCR, art. 2(1).  
20 See below, Part III. 
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It was therefore a starting premise of economic and social rights that their realization would be 
dependent upon available resources, time, and effective institutions of government; states with 
limited resources would have a justification for continued non-fulfilment. The starting point is 
not without its critics. For many, the standard is not rigorous enough to challenge the low 
performance of states with limited resources, or to halt the backsliding of those with greater 
means.21 The discomfort with what we might see as a ‘nonreviewable privilege of indefinite 
postponement’22 has been the basis for alternative, more fixed, standards of accountability, such 
as the ‘minimum core obligation’ or the duty of ‘non-retrogression’. And yet for others, 
progressive realization provides a useful compromise for the variation in states at international 
law, since it allows scrutiny and accountability, but not rigidity or uniformity. It is also 
appropriate for constitutional rights, enforced domestically. Thus, from this starting point, 
progressive realization ties well into ‘optimizing’ theories of constitutional rights, which seek to 
hold the state to account for the compatibility of its actions with providing the maximum degree 
of protection for all rights.23 Such theories have become widely influential as constitutions have 
recognized a greater number of interests as subject to legal guarantees. The ‘optimizing’ 
approach requires all rights to be given the greatest degree of respect, proportionate to the 
interests of others; an assessment which takes into account both the degree of rights-deprivation 
and the time in which it is experienced. 
And indeed, this obligation of ‘progressive realization’ also ties well into contemporary theories 
of rights. For instance, a ‘maximizing’ theory of consequential ‘goal rights’, defends the view 
that rights can be realized according to a variable, contextual, scale. Under this leading 
philosophical standpoint, the variability of the standard of obligation does not convert such 
claims to a category of non-right, but instead merely supplements the ‘perfect obligations’ that 
delineate certain forms of rights-based action with ‘imperfect obligations’ that are more varied, 
                                                 
21 This criticism is related to the idea of human rights backsliding, which documents the phenomenon of too-low an 
international standard in international human rights norms exerting a ‘downward pull on high-performing states,’ 
linked causally to their membership of the human rights regime: see Andrew T. Guzman & Katerina Linos, ‘Human 
Rights Backsliding’ (2014) 102 California Law Review 603.   
22 Frank I. Michelman, ‘Socioeconomic  Rights  in  Constitutional  Law:  Explaining  America  Away’ (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 663-86, 83. 
23 E.g., Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Julian Rivers (trans.) (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional rights as principles: On the structure and domain of 
constitutional justice’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 574-96. 
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but equally necessary, to satisfy especially important, and socially influenceable, freedoms.24 
Such obligations provide scope, always, for further improvement.25 And present unrealizability 
is not supposed to turn ‘a claimed right [into] a non-right. Rather, it motivates further social 
action’.26 Yet while the assumptions of maximization may be shared within international human 
rights law, they have not always guided legal interpretation.  
A. The duty to realize rights progressively 
The duty to realize economic and social rights progressively was initially inserted into the text of 
the ICESCR, after heavy promotion by the United States,27 and heavy contestation along both 
East-West and North-South axes in 1966.28 Yet since that time, the concept of progressive 
realization has not followed a singular, linear, interpretation, and various complementary or 
supplementary concepts have been introduced. Three significant approaches are detailed below. 
This variety has not, however, diminished the influence of adopting progressive implementation 
as an appropriate standard for economic and social rights, and even, on occasion, civil and 
political rights.29 Several subsequent human rights instruments have adopted the formula of 
progressive realization in outlining the state obligation, oftentimes in exact terms. Most recently, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, affirms this standard for realizing the 
economic, social and cultural rights of persons with disabilities, ‘without prejudice’ to 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 384. (‘Just as utilitarians want to pursue 
maximization of utilities and the violability of that approach is not compromised by the fact there always remains 
scope for further improvement … human rights advocates want recognized human rights to be maximally 
realized.’). 
27 Sally-Anne Way, ‘The “Myth” and Mystery of US History on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The 1947 
“United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Rights”’ (2014) 36 Human 
Rights Quarterly, 4, 869. 
28 Roland Burke, ‘Some Rights Are More Equal than Others: The Third World and the Transformation of Economic 
and Social Rights’ (2012) 3 Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and 
Development, 427. 
29 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 130 (noting its influence on the Additional Protocol to the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and its application to the civil and political rights of the African 
Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights). 
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immediately applicable obligations. 30 That said, other human rights instruments integrating 
economic, social and cultural rights have chosen other terminology to signal the imperfect, 
polycentric or complex nature of obligations. Most recently, the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, which became effective in 2013, and establishes a complaints mechanism for economic 
and social rights, only recalls the statement on progressive realization, but utilizes a standard of 
reasonableness in review.31  
The duty to realize rights progressively has also been influential domestically, and the language 
of the ICESCR appears within several constitutions that entrench economic and social rights.32 
Domestic courts, however – including those, such as the South African Constitutional Court, 
which have embraced the justiciability of economic and social rights, have not engaged in 
interpreting the concept of progressive realization directly, focusing their efforts on more 
familiar standards, at least to common law systems, such as the ‘reasonableness’ of laws which 
impact economic and social rights.33   
Internationally, the doctrinal elaboration of the concept of progressive realization began in 
earnest in 1990, after the opening created by the end of the Cold War, and the pressures of an 
increasing number of decolonized states.34 At that time, the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights described progressive realization as a ‘necessary flexibility 
                                                 
30 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’), New York, 13 December 2006, in force 3 May 
2008, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106, art. 4(2). For inclusion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as entailing 
progressive realization, 20 November 1989, UN Doc. A/RES/44/25, art. 4 (‘CRC’), alongside the ICESCR and 
CRPD, see Report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 25, 2007, UN Doc. 
E/2007/82. 
31 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR-OP’), 10 
December 2008, in force 5 May 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/2, Preamble (recalling progressive realization) art. 
8(4) (reasonableness); Bruce Porter, ‘Reasonableness and Art. 8(4)’, in Malcolm Langford, Bruce Porter, Rebecca 
Brown & Julieta Rossi (eds.), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2016). 
32 Constitution of South Africa, ss. 26-7; see also the Constitutions of Maldives, s. 23; Kenya, ss. 21, 82; South 
Sudan s. 34; Zimbabwe ss. 73, 75, 82; Fiji ss. 31-38; Guyana s. 154a. 
33 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); see also Porter, ‘Reasonableness 
and Art. 8(4)’. 
34 Way, ‘The “Myth” and the Mystery’; Burke, ‘Some Rights Are More Equal’. 
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device’ for economic, social and cultural rights.35 In an influential General Comment outlining 
its meaning, the Committee commended the doctrine for its ability to accommodate ‘the realities 
of the real world … and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization.’36 
Recognizing the very different resources available to states, the Committee’s approach was to 
emphasize the variation in what should be considered for different state parties with different 
resources available to them. In a well-cited formulation, states were ‘to move as expeditiously 
and effectively as possible towards [full realization]. … Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive 
measures … would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified.’37  
The Committee at that time was thus alert to the temporal burden of progressive realization, and 
sought to defend the doctrine it was shaping against perceptions of indefinite delay. One aspect 
of this approach was to emphasize the similarities of the standard with the ICCPR, and the 
obligation of states to respect and ensure the relevant rights – understood by the Human Rights 
Committee as immediate in character.38 The Chair of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Philip Alston, with co-author Gerard Quinn, had criticized the ‘artificiality of 
the idealized way in which the immediate/progressive distinction is often portrayed’,39 and 
pointed to obligations under the ICESCR that were expressly immediate. The right to fair wages 
and equal remuneration for work of equal value, for example,40 and the right to form trade 
unions,41 were emphasized as taking immediate effect.42 The Committee’s later General 
Comments invariably affirmed that obligations of non-discrimination should be appropriately 
understood as immediate, especially as they need not be resource-dependent;43 other obligations 
                                                 
35 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, art. 2(1).   
36 Ibid. at para. 9. This formulation was approved, for example, in Acevedo Buendia et al v. Peru (1 July 2009, 
Series C No. 198) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) (2009) (para. 102). 
37 General Comment No. 3, para. 9. This formulation is also parsed in the chapters by Olivier De Schutter, ‘Public 
Budget Analysis’, and Rodrigo Uprimny et. al., ‘Bridging the Gap’, in this volume.  
38 UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 5. 
39 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, at 173. 
40 ICESCR, art. 7(a)(i). 
41 ICESCR, art. 8. 
42 General Comment No. 3. 
43 CESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2 July 2009, 
E/C.12/GC/20, art. 2(2) of the ICESCR; see also Malcolm Langford & Jeff King, ‘Committee on Economic, Social, 
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should include ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted’ steps, even if not immediate.44 As we will see 
below, however, some of the nominally ‘immediate’ obligations of non-discrimination, such as 
those stipulating that policies to eliminate discrimination on racial and gender grounds be 
pursued ‘without delay’45 nevertheless allow for a varied understanding of their punctuality. 
Both immediacy and progressiveness accommodated the idea that some time was required.  
The approach thus epitomized a teleological emphasis that has become a feature of the postwar 
human rights regime: providing advocates with a standard for calling out non-fulfilment, but 
omitting to state any bright-line rule.46 This approach is not dissimilar to other standards in 
international law, such as (among many possible examples), the good faith standard for 
signatories obliged not to defeat a treaty’s purpose,47 the obligation on states to observe ‘due 
diligence’ in respecting human rights,48 to establish ‘temporary special measures’ for eliminating 
discrimination,49 or to pursue ‘sustainable development’.50 A recent formulation, in a parallel 
international regime, is for parties to pursue the ‘highest possible ambition’ in submitting to 
obligations.51 Partly, the open-ended nature of such obligations is a result of the inevitably 
positive obligations required for the fulfilment of human rights – duties on the state to act, not 
only to restrain from doing so. But the permissibility of some delay is also built into the very 
                                                 
and Cultural Rights: Past, Present and Future’, in Malcolm Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp. 477, 492-95. 
44 E.g., General Comment No. 13 (the right to education), E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999). 
45 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 21 December 1965, 
in force 4 January 1969, UN Doc. A/RES/2106(XX), art. 2(1); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), New York, 18 December 1979, UN Doc. A/RES/34/180, art. 2; see also 
CRC, art. 2(1) for a declaration of respecting and ensuring rights.  
46 The distinction between legal standards and rules is well canvased by Kathleen Sullivan, ‘The Justices of Rules 
and Standards’ (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review 19 (describing the approach to the distinction among members of 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331; 
(1969) 8 ILM 679; UKTS (1980) 58. 
48 HRC, General Comment No. 31, para. 8. 
49 CEDAW, art. 4 para. 1; see also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW 
Committee’), General Recommendation No. 5: Temporary Special Measures, 1988; CEDAW Committee, General 
Recommendation No. 25: Temporary Special Measures, 1999. 
50 Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 25 September 2015, UN Doc. 
A/RES/70/1, available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs (accessed 12 June 2018); for a report tying 
sustainability into progressive realization, see Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, 11 July 2013, A/HRC/24/44.   
51 Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘“Dynamic Differentiation”: The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression and 
Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 5 Transnational Environmental Law, 285-303 
(addressing states’ common but differentiated obligations to address climate change). 
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structure of accountability within international law: ratification is premised on the idea that states 
may be presently failing to comply with the terms of a treaty, but agree to do so over time.52  
Not surprisingly, efforts to refine the doctrine of progressive realization have diverged.  Some 
commentators have focused on the question of resources, and how they can be measured.53 
Others have advanced interpretations of each right that remove their variability, or have instead 
come up with separate metrics to assess and compare states’ performance. These approaches are 
detailed below – and while they can be thought to supplement the progressive realization 
standard, it is suggested that they each, in their own way, fail to address the variable of time.  
B. Supplements to progressive realization  
The first important supplement to the concept of progressive realization is the ‘minimum core’ 
doctrine, which was established early in order to establish universal thresholds for all state 
parties to meet. For example, the Committee in its 1990 General Comment elaborated on the 
meaning of progressive realization by introducing the idea that the ‘minimum essential levels’ of 
food, primary health care, shelter and housing, or education, were required to be satisfied by all 
state parties to the ICESCR, irrespective of available resources. A lengthy debate about the 
interpretation of a ‘minimum core’ ensued, as well as what its legal consequences should be.54 
While some commentators called for such obligations to be recognized as those non-derogable 
under the ICESCR, or alternatively justiciable by courts, others emphasized that minimum core 
obligations should be interpreted as those that were immediate, and not subject to any 
                                                 
52 Proposals that would permit states to become parties to the ICCPR, for example, only if they had already 
implemented, or would simultaneously take the necessary measures to secure those rights were rejected during the 
drafting: see Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 12. 
He notes that the Third Committee resolved, in the end, that ‘the notion of implementation at the earliest possible 
moment was implicit in article 2 as a whole’. The reporting requirement that would become article 40 was also seen 
as ‘an effective curb on undue delay’. 
53 De Schutter, ‘Public Budget Analysis’; CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation of “Maximum Available 
Resources”’. 
54 Katharine G. Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ 
(2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113-75. 
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permissible delay.55 That interpretation, which reinforces the connection between the minimum 
core and temporal accountability, was recently confirmed in a prominent analysis commissioned 
by the World Bank.56 Under that view, the minimum core applies to all obligations that must be 
realized immediately; obligations left out of the ‘core’ are those with lesser priority. A concern 
with this reading of the minimum core is, of course, that the broad promise of economic and 
social rights is left, in the main, to the indefinite category; and immediate duties are restricted to 
minimal ones.57 To some extent, this concern equates with a broader unease that economic and 
social rights law has become too focused on a subsistence-based, ameliorative interpretation of 
rights at the expense of targeting the broader concerns of distributive justice, such as economic 
inequality.58 In so far as inequality can also be seen as heightened by – or indeed constituted by – 
waiting, a narrow, minimalistic interpretation of the core does the same thing.  
A second approach is the standard of ‘non-retrogression’, which supplements the concept of 
progressive realization by focusing on current baselines. The idea, which the Committee also 
adopted in 1990, and elaborated increasingly during the economic crises that followed, was to 
interpret progressive realization as consistent with the idea of a heightened obligation to prevent 
any retraction of current rights-realization. Non-retrogression was thus related to the idea of self-
appointed benchmarks for state performance, but one pegged in real time: allowing every state to 
be scrutinized for any backward step in respect of economic and social rights. Since the 
Committee’s introduction of the notion that ‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ would have to 
be justified by state parties, the concept of ‘non-retrogression’ has become increasingly 
detailed.59 The Committee has suggested that a heightened level of scrutiny attends to such 
                                                 
55 Young, ‘Minimum Core’, 117. National courts have engaged more recently with a justiciable minimum core: 
David Landau, ‘The Promise of a Minimum Core Approach: The Colombian Model for Judicial Review of Austerity 
Measures’, in Aoife Nolan (ed.), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) pp. 267-98. 
56 John Tasioulas, Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now (Washington, DC: Nordic Trust 
Fund World Bank Research Paper, 2017). 
57 Compare i.e. General Comment No. 3, and General Comment No 13 (emphasizing the need for effective and 
expeditious steps for all obligations), with Tasioulas, ‘Here and Now’ (deprioritizing all behind the minimum core). 
58 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2018). 
59 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the 
‘Maximum of Available Resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, E/C.12/2007/1 (10 May 2007), 
para. 9. This is further elaborated in the chapters by De Schutter and Uprimny et. al., in this volume. 
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backward steps, stating that, if any retrogression occurred, the state would have to prove that it 
was intended only after consideration of all alternatives, with due reference to the ‘totality of the 
rights’ and the ‘full use of the State party’s maximum available resources.’60 This standard has 
become a focal point for debate in challenges to the austerity programs that were introduced after 
the global financial crisis of 2008.61  Nonetheless, even when non-retrogression brings important 
attention to states that are dismantling previously guaranteed standards,62 it may direct less 
attention to those experiencing economic and social rights deprivation but unbenefited by the 
baseline status quo in well-resourced states, or those living in countries where social 
responsibilities along a statist model have not yet been entrenched.63 It thus deflects the 
challenge of waiting for rights. 
In a departure from the above-mentioned doctrinal standpoints of evaluation, a third approach 
which supplements the concept of progressive realization is grounded on differentiating data by 
country or across time. Although the previous approaches also rely on information and 
monitoring, under this approach ‘progressive realization’ is demonstrated by an evaluation of 
countries’ self-identified benchmarks and goals, or a comparison against more universal 
indicators. Such approaches, which seek to supplement legalistic notions with close 
measurement, commenced in earnest in 1990.64 Nonetheless, an increasingly concerted 
international effort, and rising technological capabilities, has led to more ambitious measures of 
                                                 
60 CESCR, An Evaluation of the Obligation, paras. 8-10. See also General Comment No. 13: The Right to 
Education, 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 45; General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health, 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 32; General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water, 20 January 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, para. 19. 
61 Nicholas J. Lusiani & Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria of the 
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic and Social Rights’, in Aoife Nolan (ed.), Economic and Social Rights 
after the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 121; see also Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘Austerity and the Faded Dream of a “Social Europe”’, in Nolan (ed.), ‘After the Global Financial 
Crisis’, p. 169. 
62 Committee on ICESCR, Letter to State Parties dated 16 May 2012; see also Report of Navanethem Pillay, High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Social and Human Rights Questions: Human Rights, 7 May 2013, UN Doc. 
E/2013/82, paras. 69-71.   
63 E.g., Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties’ (2005) 19 Ethics & International Affairs 
55-83. 
64 The first Special Rapporteur on the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Danilo Türk 
recommended efforts to develop ‘appropriate indicators to measure achievements in the progressive realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights,’ as early as 1990. Danilo Türk, see also Vienna Conference (1993). 
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‘progressive realization, 65  such as the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index.66 
This index examines available survey and administrative data to reveal trends in progress and 
regress over time, and as between countries. By combining the measurements of available GDP 
with other variables of capacity and obstacles,67 this approach analyses ‘progressive realization’ 
in quantitative, rather than conceptual, terms, and the consequence is to reprimand well-
resourced but badly governed countries and celebrate those that do much more with less. While 
criticisms have been applied to the SERF index in particular, and indicators in general, these are 
generally concerned with the use of such data as a stand-in for governance – that is, as an 
unreflective method to decide funding and resources – rather than the methodology of 
information gathering per se.68  
These three supplementary approaches to understanding and implementing the ‘progressive 
realization’ obligation overlap and the Committee has adopted, at various points and sometimes 
concurrently, each of them. Nonetheless, they are sourced in quite different epistemologies – the 
minimum core approach resonates with priority-focused efforts in distributive justice; the non-
retrogression approach is most accessible to the proportionality-focused inquiries of public 
law;69 and the continuum of measurement reflects efforts to integrate accountability mechanisms 
with the social sciences. Each are problematic, in different ways; but each share a general 
limitation with respect to time. While temporality often plays a part in signalling a failure to fully 
realize economic and social rights, it operates, in the first two approaches, as an on-off binary – 
both the minimum core and non-retrogression register either an immediacy of obligation or a 
justified (and thus largely unaccountable) delay. The third approach of ranking, reliant on 
                                                 
65 Efforts include those from the WHO, FAO, and UN-Habitat and OHCHR; other independent efforts include Eitan 
Felner, ‘Closing the “Escape Hatch”: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realization of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice, 402; see also De Schutter, ‘Public Budget Analysis’. 
66 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer &Susan Randolph, Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015). , building upon predecessors in human rights-informed development rankings, such 
as the Human Development Index, and civil and political rights rankings, such as the Freedom House index 
67 Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index available at: https://serfindex.uconn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/1843/2017/04/Core_2005to2015.pdf (accessed 12 June 2018). 
68 Kevin Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry (eds.), Governance by Indicators: 
Global Power through Quantification and Ranking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Sally Engle Merry, 
The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender Violence and Sex Trafficking (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 162 . 
69 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).   
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indicators, tends to accept a shifting temporal horizon, in which the independent variable of time 
plays no dependent rights-infringing role, outside of the context of ‘structural indicators’ that 
assess the stipulated time frames in state planning. These aspects are analysed in the next section. 
This contrasts strikingly with the experience of time, and in particular waiting, to which the final 
section turns.   
III. Temporal accountability in the ICESCR  
So far, I have detailed the evolving interpretation, and the development of supplementary 
concepts to hold states (internationally) or governments (domestically) to account for economic 
and social rights realization. But the basic flexibility introduced by progressive realization (a 
doctrinal standard reserved, it bears repeating, only for economic, social and cultural rights), was 
exaggerated by the assumption that economic and social rights would be demanding of 
resources, which would require time to accumulate and organize. An extension of time seemed 
appropriate. Of course, later conceptualizations of the duties accompanying rights, such as 
philosopher Henry Shue’s influential three-part typology of duties70 (adopted and adapted by the 
Committee as the ‘respect-protect-fulfil’ typology71), helped to clarify that sometimes rights 
realization might require only minimal resources – such as for duties of respect – and yet in other 
instances might require investment into a regulatory regime – such as for duties to protect – or 
even greater expenditures, in terms of social services delivery or goods provision – such as for 
duties to fulfil.  The time required for each would be similarly different. Duties of respect might 
be fulfilled immediately; duties of protecting and fulfilling rights might take longer, and might 
require continual maintenance and updating.72  
                                                 
70 Shue, Basic Rights.  
71 See, e.g. Asbjorn Eide, Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right (1989); see also Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/12, para. 6. The typology has been 
utilized by various UN agencies and programmes, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, UN-Habitat, the 
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Health 
Organization. 
72 Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Cape Town: Juta 
Academic, 2010) (noting the arguments that the obligation to respect, in its negative manifestations, is not subject to 
progressive realization). See also Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/4/20, 29 January 
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The previously approaches to understanding ‘progressive realization’ – sounding in the 
minimum core concept, non-retrogression, or comparative ranking – are connected differently 
with time. In the first, the minimum core analysis removes time as an adjustable standard: the 
core obligations are immediate and no delay is countenanced, although non-core obligations are 
tolerated as those for which the postponement of realization is acceptable (although, in at least 
some accounts, still accountable73). In the second, non-retrogression views time as a path in 
which materialization may progress, and thus flags moves in the wrong direction: the present 
status quo must be protected, and any diminishment of rights-protections are immediately 
suspect (although may be justified on certain proportionate, often time-sensitive terms).74 By 
contrast, in the third approach, indicators tie into their assessments a notion of progress that runs 
across different aspects of rights fulfilment, making time’s passing of the nature of rights 
materialization. Thus, while indicators can be disaggregated by time75 – as well as, as is 
common, by gender, race, or urban versus rural residence – these are methods of measurement, 
not castigation. And although the information contained in indicators can ground a theory of 
infringement, standing alone they favour longitudinal studies and multiple ‘objective criteria’,76 
without explicit time caps or frames. These viewpoints were not inevitable, as the historical 
debates about the concept of ‘progressive realization’ make clear. 
A. Time frames and time limits   
Earlier debates about the ICESCR reveal that a more robust temporal accountability was 
suggested. In the original formulation of progressive realization, there were proposals to insert 
time limits into the concept. The Third Committee of the General Assembly and the United 
                                                 
2007, para. 11. For the view of the typology as ‘essentially static’, see Olivier De Schutter, ‘Introduction’, in Olivier 
De Schutter (ed.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, p. xix. 
73 E.g., General Comment No 13. 
74 Katharine G. Young, ‘Proportionality, Reasonableness, and Economic and Social Rights’, in Vicki C. Jackson & 
Mark V. Tushnet (eds.), Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017); see also Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, ‘Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global 
Economic Crisis and Constitutional Litigation’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 660. 
Restrictions may be proportionate because of their timeliness or temporariness, but at times this is a separate inquiry. 
75 For a general account of bringing temporal measures into the social science, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: 
History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
76 CESCR, ‘Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the Maximum of Available Resources’, para. 10. 
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Nations Human Rights Commission, when negotiating the treaties, debated the idea. The 
representative of the newly independent Congo, for example, proposed to include a reasonable 
time limit under progressive realization, on the theory of converting certain obligations to a more 
timely, calculable, and reliable standard.77 Such a proposal was opposed by the representative 
from Chile, who felt that states should be entitled to proceed according to a time scale 
determined by their own resources;78 a view that ultimately carried. Similarly, a proposal by 
Costa Rica to introduce the words ‘and at an accelerated rate’ after the word ‘progressively’ was 
aimed at preventing the use of delaying tactics by state parties.79 During a working group, the 
Egyptian delegate Mahmud Azmi had argued that the phrase ‘if necessary’ should be inserted 
after the term ‘progressively’, thereby signalling the applicability of the clause only to 
obligations requiring time.80 Again, these amendments were not accepted, and the Third 
Committee responsible for drafting the two covenants settled on the current formula of 
progressive realization for the ICESCR,81 with significant support from the U.S. 
 
This is not to say that timelines and timeliness were not introduced elsewhere. Discrete 
obligations were accompanied by a more fixed time scale. The obligation to secure free and 
compulsory primary education for children, for example, was made temporally accountable in 
both conduct and result. States presently without primary education were required, on becoming 
a party, to commit to undertake, ‘within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of 
action … within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan’.82 Similarly, the reporting 
requirement for states was also accompanied by a stipulated time period – of one year.83  
                                                 
77 Proposal of Mr. Sita (Congo), UNGA Third Committee (1962), discussed in Ben Saul, David Kinley & Jacqueline 
Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and 
Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 154. The travaux of the ICCPR also indicate an eagerness to 
include specified time limits, ‘reasonable’ time limits, or the requirement that each State fix its own time limit in its 
instrument of ratification. See McGoldrick, ‘The Human Rights Committee’, p. 12. 
78 A/C.3/SR.1181, at 237, para. 26 (1962); discussed by Craven, ‘A Perspective on its Development’, p. 131. 
79 Proposal by Mr. Redondo (Costa Rica), UNGA Third Committee (1962) 17 UN GAOR C.3 (1025th mtg.), 26 
November 1962, UN Doc. A/C.3/l.1025, cited in Alston & Quinn, ‘Nature and Scope’, 177.  
80 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 236th meeting, 10 May 1951, E/CN.4/SR.236, 18, 
discussed by Burke, ‘Some Rights Are More Equal’, 434. 
81 ICESCR, art. 2(1); see also Way, ‘The “Myth” and Mystery’.  
82 ICESCR, art. 14 
83 ICESCR, art. 17. 
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In the intervening half century of the Committee’s scrutiny over state reports, Concluding 
Observations, and its multiple General Comments, new methods to monitor, if not regulate, the 
passing of time have been introduced. For example, the requirement of explicit time frames is 
present within many ‘structural indicators’ for economic and social rights. Routinely, discrete 
economic and social rights measurements depend upon the ‘time frame and coverage of national 
policy’: for example, the structural indicators for indicating the progressive realization of the 
right to health include time frames for national policies on sexual and reproductive health, 
abortion, foetal sex determination policy, child health and nutrition, physical and mental health, 
medicines access, and for national policies for persons with disabilities.84 Measures to promote 
the rights of the child, as well as the right to food, have included time frames for achievement.85 
In measures to realize the right to housing, public housing programs are required to have, 
alongside plans of action, and in a concession to the perspective of rights-holders, published and 
transparent wait lists, with express estimates of fulfilment.86 And when the Committee has 
outlined action in relation to austerity, it required time frames in which steps were to be taken.87  
Other human rights regimes have made use of these trends. In the parallel regime of disability 
rights, for example, the recommendations for monitoring progressive realization have been 
markedly concrete. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has required, for 
example, a plan of action by states, which includes ‘(a) a time frame for implementing economic, 
social and cultural rights, (b) time-bound benchmarks of achievement and (c) indicators of 
success.’88 In contrast, the enterprise of monitoring sustainable development goals, which collect 
information not on human rights compliance but rather on performance indicators for meeting 
                                                 
84 Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights and WHO, The Right to Health, Structural 
indicators for the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: Table 7.1, 
Merry, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a: Such timeframes extend to other policies as 
an incident of quantitative data measurement: 2012, p. 17. 
85 See, e.g, CESCR General Comment No. 12 (2000): The right to adequate food (E/C.12/1999/5), para. 29; General 
Comment No. 14, para. 56; FAO, The Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to 
Food in the Context of National Food Security (2004), Guideline 3. 
86 Rory O'Connell, Aoife Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke & Eoin Rooney, Applying an International Human 
Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources (Routledge, 2014).  
87 E.g., CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation of “Maximum Available Resources”’, para. 8(e) (alongside 
proportionality)  
88 UN Handbook, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, HR/P/PT/17, p. 29,  
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Disabilities_training_17EN.pdf (accessed, 12 June 
2018).  
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timed development goals (now by 2030), use time frames and outcomes as an explicit method of 
pressure.89 
B. The immediate/progressive distinction  
Just as the alternative approaches of time limits or time scales offer a different perspective on 
progressive realization, they also challenge the immediate/progressive distinction that has proved 
so immovable. The distinction is especially problematic when invoked to maintain the separation 
of the categories of so-called ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’ human rights. This is 
because it is inaccurate. For instance, the obligations to ‘respect and protect’ civil and political 
rights under the ICCPR,90 despite lying outside of notions of ‘progressive realization’, and 
understood as subject to ‘immediate effect’, also record acceptable time frames for compliance. 
A right to a trial without undue delay, for example, is specified in a number of international 
human rights treaties. While there is no specific time frame by which the trial must occur,91 
commentators suggest that a 20 month maximum may have crystallized. The prohibition on cruel 
and degrading treatment is also accompanied by time periods for respecting certain obligations, 
such as by when medical care should be provided to prisoners (in an appropriate and timely 
fashion).92  
The Human Rights Committee has suggested that ‘immediacy’ does not equate with ‘instant’. 
Moreover, if an infringement of a civil and/or political right is found on a large scale, a measure 
of delay may be a feature of redress. For example, commentators have noted that perhaps the 
                                                 
89 E.g., United Nations, Statistics and indicators for the post-2015 development agenda, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1997UNTT_MonitoringReport_WEB.pdf (accessed 12 
June 2018). 
90 ICCPR, art. 2(1). 
91 ICCPR, art. 9; Guzman & Linos, ‘Human Rights Backsliding’, 627-9, noting amongst other sources OHCHR and 
International Bar Association, Human Rights in The Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for 
Judges, Prosecutors And Lawyers (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), pp. 267-71, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9Titleen.pdf (accessed 12 June 2018). The Human Rights 
Committee has held that a delay of 24 months, 29 months, 31months and longer, between arrest and trial, all violate 
article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR; a delay of 18 months, however, has been considered not unreasonable.  
92 ICCPR, arts. 6, 7, 10. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Lantsova v. Russian Federation (26 March 2002) UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/74/763/1997, para. 9(2); Rick Lines, ‘The right to health of prisoners in international human rights 
law’ (2008) 4 International Journal of Prisoner Health, 3, 22-4. 
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most quintessentially ‘negative’, ‘immediate’ obligation (the prohibition on torture) may entail a 
timed roll-out for remediation.93 Similarly, even obligations of non-discrimination – which the 
Committee has recognized as immediate – are often accompanied by some delay. The classic 
equal protection case of Brown v. Board of Education, to take a prominent domestic example, 
was met with a rolled-out remedy; the United States Supreme Court requiring states to end 
school segregation ‘with all deliberate speed’.94 Only through repeated litigations did that 
obligation crystallize into a more immediate requirement. 
A common thread in measuring time, in relation to the purportedly ‘immediate’ obligations 
attached to civil and political rights, is to ascertain its proportionality: the duration of rights-
deprivation must not be disproportionate. This standard works with a robust assumption around 
the importance of civil and political rights and the seriousness of infringement. Yet the standard 
of proportionality has proved less robust as against infringements of economic and social 
rights.95 Along with the deference of assessment mentioned above, the failure to realize 
economic and social rights have long been associated with explicit discrimination, patterns of 
prejudice and internalized low expectations.96 This presents the worry that adjudicators or 
assessors measuring the proportionality of delay for economic and social rights realization will 
be more deferential and/or tolerate greater periods of deprivation. One response to this problem 
is to increase time-based measures into assessments of rights infringements. Another, pursued in 
an introductory manner below, is to examine more carefully one impact of delay – in particular, 
the experience of waiting – to highlight its effect on putative rights-claimants.  
                                                 
93 Tung Yin, ‘Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time’ (2005) 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy, 149, 209-10.  
94 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
95 Young, ‘Proportionality’. 
96 Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Crisis and the Quotidian in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2012) 44 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 19, 31; see also Varun Gauri, ‘Social Rights and Economics: 
Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries’, in Philip Alston & Mary Robinson (eds.), Human 
Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 2005), p. 65. 
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IV. Waiting for Progressive Realization  
The primary aim of this chapter is to draw attention to the relative absence of temporal 
accountability among contemporary interpretations of economic and social rights, drawing 
attention to the ‘progressive realization’ standard of obligation and its supplements under the 
ICESCR.  Clearly, the recognition of ‘immediate’ obligations, and the development of time 
frames and time limits, give some prominence to the unacceptability of delay in certain cases. 
Yet my claim is that our assessment of economic and social rights requires both more developed 
metrics – of how long a delay is too long – and a more nuanced approach to time. In this latter 
respect, I argue that waiting for rights can conflict with other basic goals of rights recognition. In 
making clear this argument, it is worth turning from the perspective of the state to the 
perspective of the rights-holder: to how time is experienced, rather than measured. Although the 
state is obviously present in structuring this experience, this perspective points to a compounded 
experience of rights deprivation, that has its own effects on rights. 
The modern experience of time is an accelerated one: as a result of drastic changes in 
transportation, communication, production and exchange technologies, the pace of life has, by 
many accounts, sped up.97 When we perceive delay and are forced to wait for goods, services, or 
opportunities, for example, we are often only experiencing the impression of delay – an 
impatience which may be linked to the immense time savings that many of us currently enjoy, in 
comparison with previous forms of delivery or fulfilment.98 And yet these time savings have 
been disproportionality distributed, and the experience of delay is oftentimes material – and 
ubiquitous – for certain groups, particularly persons with disabilities, women, and ethnic 
minorities, and particular those whose ascriptive status intersects – as they more often do – with 
the experience of poverty.  
                                                 
97 E.g. Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys (trans.) (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015); William Scheuerman, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Empire of Speed’ (2001) 34 
Polity 41-67. 
98 Rosa, ‘Social Acceleration’, pp. 84-5. 
 
 
23 
It is in this accelerated, stratified era, that the delay structured into rights realization – and gaps 
in the international doctrine of progressive realization – take on new significance. A clear 
implication should be that, at the very least, the measurement of time – and accountability of 
delay – must include an assessment – from the perspective of the rights-holder - of waiting. The 
justification of ‘waiting’, implicit in the notion of progressive realization, is I suggest at odds 
with the moral agency and mobilization associated with rights. This is partly, too, an effect of its 
unequal distribution. Along with the capitalist premise that ‘time is money’, commodified time 
allows those who can afford it to purchase the removal of delay, leaving those who cannot to 
simply wait. The result is a new form of differentiation between the haves and the have-nots that 
must enter into analyses of rights. 
Of course, this experience of waiting is not wholly separable from the teleology of the postwar 
human rights project. As mentioned above, the UDHR settled on an international symbol of 
human progress: a trajectory of advancement that Mark Goodale has analogized to Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s ‘arc of the moral universe’.99 For Goodale, the universalism of human rights is 
suggestive of a ‘moral mirage: it attracts people to it, but it gets fainter the closer the 
approach’.100 This is not necessarily inimical to the mobilizing potential of human rights: 
Goodale is among those who assert that the gap between the experience of rights and their appeal 
and legitimacy does not necessarily undermine the strength of the discourse.101 Others are more 
skeptical, suggesting that the failure to deliver on the promise of much human rights rhetoric, 
while not necessarily invalidating rights arguments, can nonetheless weaken them. 102  
But what about the official acceptance of delay? Does this provide too great a challenge to the 
moral agency motivated by official rights rhetoric? What are the other effects of waiting for 
                                                 
99 Mark Goodale, ‘Human Rights and Moral Agency’, in Cindy Holder & David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The 
Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 421. 
100 Ibid., p. 420. 
101 Michael Goodhart, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Contestation’, in Mark Goodale (ed.), Human Rights at the 
Crossroads (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp. 31-44, at 40 (noting ‘repeated abuses of human rights … 
may even have strengthened’ the discourse). 
102 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’, in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy 
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 321-339, at 322. 
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rights? As Martin Luther King Jr. himself noted, in a key text of the American civil rights 
movement: 
For years now I have heard the word ‘Wait!’ It rings in the ear of every Negro with a 
piercing familiarity. This ‘wait’ has almost always meant ‘never.’ We must come to see 
with the distinguished jurist of yesterday that ‘justice too long delayed is justice 
denied.’103 
Clearly, frustration with waiting can trigger the social movement action necessary for rights 
materialization to occur.104 And yet the experience of delay can also work in other ways. While it 
is not the purpose of this chapter to provide comprehensive evidence of the effects of waiting, I 
want to conclude with a number of observations, suggestive of a number of new questions for the 
field. This takes me, not to ethnographies of human rights, but rather to ethnographies of waiting 
that have been developed in the social sciences, particular those that track how the daily 
experiences of ordinary people construct an idea of the state.105 Such accounts have been slow to 
appear – the difficulties of observing the absence, rather than the presence, of a recordable 
activity, have often directed researchers’ attention elsewhere.106 Moreover, there is a common 
sense acceptance of the inevitability of waiting: ‘everybody – state officials, social workers, and 
the poor themselves – thinks of the waiting of the destitute as something obvious and 
unavoidable.’107 This acceptance of waiting may be one more aspect of the adaptive preferences 
                                                 
103 Martin Luther King Jr.’s, ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’, The Atlantic, April 16, 1963; with an implied reference 
to the Magna Carta. 
104 Ibid: King’s letter offers a prominent example. See also, e.g., the documentation of social movement protest in 
South Africa by Jackie Dugard, Tshepo Madlingozi, & Kate Tissington, ‘Rights-Compromised or Rights-Savvy? 
The Use of Rights-Based Strategies to Advance Socio-Economic Struggles by Abahlali baseMjondolo, the South 
African Shack-Dwellers’ movement’, in Helena Alviar García, Karl E. Klare, & Lucy A. Williams (eds.), Social and 
Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries (Routledge, 2015), pp. 23-43; see also the chapters by 
Liebenberg and Ryan Chance in this volume.  
105 Akhil Gupta, ‘Narratives of Corruption: Anthropological and Fictional; Accounts of the Indian State’ (2005) 6 
Ethnography, 5-34. 
106 Javier Auyero, Patients of the State: The Politics of Waiting in Argentina (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2012), p. 123. 
107 Ibid.; see also Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason, Randal Johnson (trans.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998) (describing the doxa of welfare). 
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and ‘realism’ that can mislead many about the misfortunes – or rights infringements – they 
experience.108  
By contrasting these ethnographies of waiting with the delay factored into rights, I want to 
suggest that theories of rights need to be more sensitive to time from the point of view of rights-
holders: not in any absolutist sense of avoiding the demarcation of special interests as ‘rights’ if 
they cannot be realized immediately; but rather in a more context-sensitive appreciation of its 
effects. The following are features of waiting that run counter to the promise of rights. Rather 
than the inevitable result of variation and flexibility, progressive realization – and the lapses of 
time thereby tolerated – becomes a more problematic concept. In particular, the experience of 
waiting in its current forms – which I explore here in its (a) protracted, (b) uncertain, and (c) 
individuated manifestations – require closer attention. Far from mobilizing individuals to agitate 
for social change and claim their rights, the experience of waiting can bring about the opposite 
result. 
A. Protracted Waiting 
First, the waiting associated with the realization of rights has assumed a protracted, extended, 
form, in many parts of the world.109 Ethnographic studies of asylum seekers and refugees, urban 
slum dwellers, the unemployed and the rural poor, all highlight the experience of long-term 
waiting – often in staggering terms.110 Some have argued that such experiences have increased, 
especially amongst the poorest, since the 1960s: one commentator notes that whole countries, 
such as Zimbabwe in 2008, are effectively waiting for a better future.111 Indeed, waiting may be 
so protracted that it prompts the abandonment of the expectation of progress, at least in local 
                                                 
108 Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’, p. 47 (describing ‘unreasoned fatalism’); see also Gauri, ‘Social Rights and 
Economics’, p. 65.   
109 Auyero, ‘Patients of the State’, p. 111.   
110 These are described in Craig Jeffrey, Timepass: Youth, Class and the Politics of Waiting in India (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 3-9. See also Rebecca Rotter, ‘Waiting in the asylum determination process: 
Just an empty interlude?’ (2015) 25 Time & Society 80 - 101. 
111 Jeffrey, ‘Timepass’, citing Jean-François Bayart, Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, Richard Nice (trans.) (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p.4 (noting that many are obliged to ‘wait for everything to come from others’). 
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terms. Anthropologist James Ferguson has observed a shift, in fieldwork in Africa, ‘from a focus 
on temporal dynamics of societal progress toward a new reliance on individual spatial mobility’: 
that agency is accessed not by reliance on progress, but on egress.112 
Discrete increases in waiting time are certainly in evidence in both the Global North and South, 
such as in the delivery of health care, education, or water services.113 The growing privatization 
of many sectors, while vaunted as increasing efficiency in service delivery, often externalizes 
many costs through time. While market tools can actively minimize the wait for those who are 
able to pay, they increase it substantially for others.114 Arguably, then, the turn to market-based 
reforms make time measures all the more pressing, as well as other benchmarks. 
This feature of extended waiting is complicated by the fact that, although it can be structured 
generally by the law, the experience of waiting is not universal. People experience waiting 
subjectively – and it can be surmised that the very young and very old, or the sick or disabled, 
experience greater costs than others who wait. Yet these costs are unaccounted for in assigning 
economic value to time, as a loss of opportunity to otherwise increase social utility or 
productivity.115 The burden of protracted waiting is therefore only glimpsed by time-based 
statistics of passing days, months or years. A non-linear, non-chronological, understanding of 
waiting must also be factored into these assessments. 
B. Uncertain Waiting  
Second, alongside protracted waiting comes disempowerment, independently occurring 
alongside the rights-deprivation in question. In many ethnographic studies, the experience of 
                                                 
112 James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2006), pp. 190-1. 
113 This is demonstrated well in chapters by Flood et. al., and Sengupta et. al., in this volume. 
114 Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2012), pp. 17-42. 
115 E.g. Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of the Allocation of Time’ (1965) 75 The Economic Journal 493. Such measures 
have become more nuanced, for example, in the quality-adjusted life year (QALY), which allows, for example, the 
assessment of health outcomes based on every quality year of life saved. For analysis with respect to human rights, 
see Alicia Ely Yamin & Ole Frithjof Norheim, ‘Taking Equality Seriously: Applying Human Rights Frameworks to 
Priority Setting in Health’ (2014) 36 Human Rights Quarterly 296-324. 
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waiting is directly connected to the hopes that people have inscribed, of a particular future, 
which continue to elude them. The experience of long-term waiting is not necessarily caused by 
the promise of rights, but it can coincide problematically with it: the effects of limbo occur, 
‘wherein people have been incited by powerful institutions to believe in particular visions of the 
future yet lack the means to realize their aspirations.’116 Although such experiences do not 
always lead to passivity,117 they often extend over many years and even decades. Sociologist 
Javier Auyero, for example, recounts the experience of one community in Argentina, enduring 
the wait for relocation from a highly toxic shantytown on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. The 
children of the community had constantly tested for high levels of lead and carcinogens, and 
municipal agents had visited often; nonetheless, the wait for some had extended to 30 years.118 
Auyero’s study documents the effects of this experience in Kafkaesque terms: residents were 
‘lured’ with vague hopes, and ‘tormented’ with unclear threats, experiencing not only the 
negative health impacts expected to occur (which we can categorize in terms of the state’s failure 
to protect the right to health, alongside other infringements) but also the profoundly 
disempowering experience of waiting. Through this experience, recounts Auyero, residents 
learned to perceive that ‘the motor or the initiative of transformative action lies elsewhere’.119  
The effects of bureaucratic control on individual agency are, of course, well known: one 
prominent theme from Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward’s classic study of access to 
welfare in the United States, was the effect of the interaction between welfare recipients and 
administrative bodies. The authors concluded that regular postponements and casual alterations 
of welfare distributions wore out the welfare recipients and discouraged them from seeking other 
benefits to which they were formally entitled.120 Auyero’s study, too, documented the mundane 
interactions between poor people and the state behind Argentina’s housing and social security 
determinations. In examining such determinations over a more than 10-year period, he noted not 
                                                 
116 Jeffrey, ‘Timepass’, p. 3 
117 Ibid., at 4, notes that some activist organizations adopt their own timelines and ignore others, thereby refusing to 
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118 Auyero, ‘Patients of the State’, p. 139. 
119 Ibid., pp. 134-5. 
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only the prolonged experience of deprivation, but also the creation of confusion, uncertainty and 
the reinforcement of subordination and political resignation in the lives of the poor. This 
experience of bureaucratic control of the waiting experience was reinforced by arbitrary actions, 
reversals, and inconsistencies. ‘Those in need,’ he described, ‘come to the welfare office and are 
faced with the general disorganization and disinformation … along with endless delays and also 
with the sudden rising of surprise paydays, and therefore they quickly learn that this is a space to 
be a complying welfare client.’ This reduces them to act, suggests Auyero, ‘not as citizens with 
rightful claims but as patients of the state.’121  
These findings are also consistent with the more general studies of waiting, which, although 
dependent on the object of the wait, summarize the impressions of their subjects that ‘uncertain 
waits are longer than known, finite waits,’ ‘unexplained waits are longer than explained waits,’ 
‘unfair waits are longer than reasonable waits,’ ‘the more valuable the service, the more patience 
the customer will show’; and ‘solo waits feel longer than group waits.’122 Commonly 
documented experiences of waiting for state goods and services are those of general limbo and 
passivity – one researcher categorized the experiences of ‘surplus time,’ ‘heightened suspense,’ 
‘lost time,’ and ‘panic and inertia,’123 These experiences should be evaluated as independent 
from (although of course compounded by) any cognizable rights-deprivation. But of course, such 
findings become even more poignant and urgent when related to the dignity, freedom, and 
equality concerns of rights, which are addressed to interests of special concern. 
C. Competition through Waiting  
Finally, where agency exists, the experience of waiting introduces a different political dimension 
to rights. In previous work, I have observed that waiting for action by the state can engender 
enmity between similarly situated claimants, as to who should be served first. In other words, 
waiting inserts the logic of competition where situational similarity invites a logic of 
                                                 
121 Auyero, ‘Patients of the State’, pp. 121-23. 
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123 Craig Jeffrey, ‘Guest Editorial: Waiting’ (2008) 26 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 954-8 at 
957.  
 
 
29 
cooperation.124 This compounds the noted individuation that can occur in the politics of rights, 
whereby the backdrop of claim-making, litigation, and individualized remedies can sometimes 
split collective efforts to secure resources.  In my work on the tensions created within ‘queues’ 
for goods and services to be provided by the state, I found that the institutionalized waiting often 
narrowed the expectations of realization ‘to an idealized priority line’.125 Those waiting often 
assumed that others who succeeded in accessing housing, or health care, had done so only as a 
result of ‘jumping the queue’: through illicit payments, political connections, or ‘unjust’ appeals 
to rights. This included those who had approached lawyers and courts to prevent evictions, or 
who litigated for health care outside of a waitlist.126 Although occurring in very different 
settings, these examples revealed tensions in the way that individual cases were given priority, or 
were assumed to have gained priority.  
Waiting for rights could, in theory, engender the type of solidarity and agitation that have been 
central to rights campaigns;127 yet such forms of social mobilization become notoriously more 
complex in campaigns for services rather than mere resistance. Moreover, waiting itself 
stratifies, just as non-recognition of rights can do.128 This means that, while rights agitation can 
be engendered, it can just as readily be thwarted. In part, this is because a focus on waiting draws 
claimants’ political focus to direct forms of state assistance, distracting from the more nuanced, 
regulative, modes in which rights, especially economic and social rights, can be realized. My 
research on the ‘queue talk’ around housing, for example, distracted from the political stakes of 
other issues, such as mortgage subsidies, or zoning protections, just as it insisted on the patience 
of those on the list.129 These political effects also run counter to the hopes of agitation and 
mobilization inherent in rights.  
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V. Conclusion  
This chapter has advanced two criticisms of rights realization over time. As a standard of state 
accountability, progressive realization has been interpreted with insufficient attention to the need 
for temporal benchmarks beyond the ‘immediate’. And as an official justification of 
postponement, progressive realization has structured an experience of waiting that confounds the 
forms of agency needed for rights agitation. Problems of waiting, priority, access and delay are 
ubiquitous in economic and social rights claims, especially with respect to the positive 
obligations, on the part of the state, to protect or fulfil rights. The developing standards of human 
rights law must become more responsive, both to the metrics of lost time and to the politics of 
waiting. While related, these two issues call attention to different fields of analysis: of the 
measures needed for rights-based accountability and of the politics that animates accountability 
in the first place. 
 
